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ABSTRACT
This article discusses the mechanisms utilized by state
governments to collect, record, and distribute personal
information gathered on citizens. States are constantly increasing
the amount ofpersonal information collected and formulating new
ways to utilize that information. During this past year, the
Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange program data
collection pilot program reached the end of three years offederal
funding. Even with the end of the Multistate Anti-Terrorism
Information Exchange program, states are still seeking to increase
the distribution of information previously available through the
program and make the information available to all state
governments. The federal government now seeks to utilize the
states to collect even more information. Congress passed the
REAL ID Act of 2005, which will require significant effort on the
part of states to comply. Finally, both state governments and the
federal government are implementing new and farther-reaching
DNA collection laws. An increasing amount of the information
collected by state agencies is available for distribution on both a
state and federal scale. The collection and distribution of this
information raises privacy concerns as an ever-increasing amount
of personal information is stored in centralized databases, and
access is available to government officials.
INTRODUCTION
The states collect personal information in a myriad of ways, some
of which are similar to, or duplicative of, the federal government.
States often face complications that are not applicable to the federal
government when collecting information and attempting to share the
information on a national scale. Federal privacy law is governed
primarily by the Privacy Act of 1974.1 However, states have
individual laws that may vary vastly in terms of what constitutes
"The author is a J.D. candidate at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, class of
2007. She holds a bachelor's degree in political science from Indiana University of
Pennsylvania and a master's degree in political science from The State University of New
York at Stony Brook.
1 Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2005).
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
protected information. Ten state constitutions explicitly recognize a
right to privacy,2 and many states have additional laws protecting
various types of privacy.3  Privacy interests receiving statutory
protection include Internet, health, education, identity, and financial
privacy. State laws protect these different types of privacy to varying
degrees.4
The discrepancy in privacy laws among the states and the federal
government played a key roll in the shutdown of the Multistate Anti-
Terrorism Information Exchange ("MATRIX") program. The
MATRIX program, which allowed participating states to collect
information and store it in a sharable database, concluded when
federal funding expired in 2005. The REAL ID Act of 2005, passed as
part of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense,
the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, 5 will place
additional constraints on the way states collect, share, and store
personal data. The portion of the REAL ID Act that will have the
greatest impact on the states promulgates rules states must follow in
issuing drivers' licenses and identification cards. States and the
federal government are also working to collect a different type of
information, DNA, by compiling databases of DNA profiles of
persons arrested or charged with criminal activity, with an increasing
emphasis on obtaining DNA samples of criminal arrestees before
conviction. The collection of various types of information creates
unique concerns about personal privacy as an ever-increasing amount
of personal information is stored in databases, both state and federally
maintained.
This article focuses on the challenges that states and the federal
government face in the collection and storage of information. It also
examines the MATRIX program shutdown and future alternatives to
state data-mining and sharing. Exploring differing perspectives on the
REAL ID Act of 2005 and the creation of the centralized databases
2 National Conference of State Legislatures, Privacy Protections in State Constitutions,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/privacy/stateconstpriv03.htm (gives an overview of
State constitutional privacy protections).
3 id.
4 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, PRIVACY,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/cip/priv/privacy.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2005) (discusses
the various statutory state privacy protections).
5 H.R. 1268, 109th Cong. (2005) (enacted).
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required by the REAL ID Act, this article also addresses the cost of
implementing the new mandates of the REAL ID Act that the states
will absorb. The new DNA collection laws balance a need to stop and
detect criminal activity nationwide with the personal privacy interests
that persons who are not yet convicted of any offense have in their
DNA.
I. MULTISTATE ANTI-TERRORISM INFORMATION EXCHANGE PROGRAM
The MATRIX ("Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information
Exchange") program, which lost funding in April 2005, was a
federally funded program that allowed State governments to access a
combination of private and government-held personal information.
The MATRIX program was similar to the federal Total Information
Awareness ("TIA") program, which also was capable of aggregating
and analyzing large amounts of data from different sources.8 The
MATRIX program used the Factual Analysis Criminal Threat Solution
("FACTS") to search available resources and to gather information. 9
Information included:
. drivers' license records;10
6 Privately held information includes information such as credit reports, and consumer
information. Government information includes drivers' license records, criminal records,
domestic records, and all other public records typically held by the States.
7 Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, What is the Matrix? ACLU Seeks Answers
on New State Run Surveillance Program (Oct. 30, 2003),
http://www.aclu.org/privacy/spying/l 5722prs20031030.html.
8 Sayaka Kawakami & Sarah C. McCarty, Privacy Year in Review: Privacy Impact
Assessments, Airline Passenger Pre-Screening, and Government Data Mining, IISJLP 219,
250-251 (2005).
9 Press Release, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, MATRIX Pilot Project Concludes
(Apr. 15, 2005), available at
http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/press-releases/expired/2005/20050415_matrixproject.html.
1o Facilitating an Enhanced Information Sharing Network that Links Law Enforcement and
Homeland Security for Federal, State, and Local Governments: Hearing on Homeland
Security Information Sharing Before the H. Comm. on Government Reform: Technology, Info.
Policy, Intergovernmental Relations, and the Census Subcomm., 108th Cong. 78 (2004)
(statement of Mark Zadra, Member Florida Department of Law Enforcement), available at
http://www.mipt.org/pdf/House108-254.pdf.
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* digital images;"
* criminal histories; 12
* data from the Department of Corrections as well as
any sexual offender history;' 3 and
* commercially available public data, such as
telephone numbers, property ownership, and any
other publicly available commercial information. 14
The information contained in FACTS was already available to local
law enforcement through other sources but was not shared beyond
state databases.' 5 The FACTS technology only provided a common
point of access that allowed law enforcement to search the data in the
same way that one would conduct an Internet query search.
16
The MATRIX program received a total of $12 million in federal
funding from the Department of Homeland Security and the
Department of Justice.17 Additional information on the MATRIX pilot
program was previously available online. However, now that the
program has concluded, the administrators removed the information,
but questions may still be addressed through an e-mail address
provided on the web site.'
11Id.
121d.
13 id.
14 id.
'
5 d at 80.
161id
17 WILLIAM J. KROUSE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGREss: THE MULTI-STATE ANTI-TERRORISM
INFORMATION EXCHANGE (MATRIX) PILOT PROJECT (2004), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32536.pdf.
'
1Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange, http://www.matrix-at.org (last visited
Sept. 15, 2006) (website discontinued, but e-mail address is provided for questions).
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A. END OF THE MATRIX PILOT PROGRAM
When the pilot MATRIX program officially concluded on April
15, 2005, the federal funding for the program had expired. Multiple
concerns led to the end of the program including: the unavailability of
additional federal funding, differing state privacy laws, and a lack of
state participation. When the program began, fifteen states were
committed to the program, but as the pilot program progressed, states
began to withdraw their support. 19 When federal funding ended, only
four states still utilized the program: Connecticut, Florida, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania. 2
0
The MATRIX program was designed to facilitate information
exchange among the states, but did not account for the differences in
state privacy laws.21 The database also drew stiff criticism when it
provided "government officials the names of 120,000 people whose
personal information supposedly fit the profile of a terrorist." 22 Many
law enforcement officials support the MATRIX program as an
important tool and argue that the use of the FACTS technology, as
aggregated by the MATRIX program, has led to many arrests.
Florida and Ohio, still find that the program has value to law
enforcement and plan to continue to utilize the information through the
FACTS technology, but not under the heading of the MATRIX
program. 24
9 Kawakami & McCarty, supra note 8, at 265.
20 Jon Craig, ACLU Presses State Not to Use Database, Citing Privacy Issues; Officials say
FACTS, MA TRIX Programs Help Catch Criminals, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr. 22, 2005,
at 05C.
21 Nicholas Hoover & Eric Chabrow, Homeland Security -How Far Have We Come?,
INFORMATION WEEK, Sept. 5, 2005, available at
httP://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=l 70700240&tid=5979.
22 Jeffrey Goldfarb, Consumer Data Stolen from Reed Elsevier, March 9, 2005, available at
http://www.insurancebroadcasting.conV031005-32.htm.
23 Craig, supra note 20.
24ld.
2006]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
B. FUTURE OF THE MATRIX PROGRAM
The information that was available through the MATRIX program
is still available through Seisint, owned by LexisNexis, although
sharing capability among the states has ended.25 Ohio will use
$259,000, annually, in federal Homeland Security funds to continue
the program statewide.26 Florida, where the MATRIX program
originated, also continues to use the programs statewide through use of
the FACTS technology. 27 In a continuing effort to create a program
similar to MATRIX and to make that technology available to the
states, on April 12, 2005, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement
put out a call for vendors to operate a program similar to the MATRIX
program, with the intention of again making it available to the states.28
C. OPPONENTS OF THE MATRIX PROGRAM AND CONTINUATION
The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") has raised privacy
concerns about the continuation of the program as more than 300,000
people had their information stolen from LexisNexis in 2005.29
Seisint has also experienced some large data breaches in the past;
names, addresses, social security numbers, and drivers' license
numbers of approximately 32,000 people were exposed by hackers. 30
The ACLU also cites general concerns with the use of data-mining
technology 31 and contends that a significant amount of the information
the MATRIX program made available to law enforcement was not
25 id.
26 Id.
27 Matt Galnor, FDLE Wants to Cast a Wider Net; Privacy Advocates Concerned, But Police
Laud System's Ability to Consolidate Data, THE FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, May 5, 2005, at A-1.
28 FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, REQUEST FOR INFORMATION: INFORMATION
SERVICES TO SUPPORT DOMESTIC SECURITY AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 2 (2005), available
at http://fcn.state.fl.us/owa-vbspdf/owa/46616_RFI00030_0.pdf.
29 Goldfarb, supra note 22.
30 id.
31 ACLU, Matrix: Myths and Reality (Feb. 10, 2004),
http://www.aclu.org/privacy/spying/14999res20040210.html.
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previously available.32 Further, there is no guarantee regarding the
accuracy of the information that was contained in the MATRIX
program. 3 Concerns about inaccuracy would continue with any
revival of the program or use of similar technologies.
D. PROPONENTS OF THE USE OF THE FACTS SYSTEM
Defenders of the FACTS technology, which Ohio and Florida will
continue to utilize, advocate its use on several grounds:
* FACTS is not a substitute for the TIA Project but is
instead a query/response based system to be used
only by trained law enforcement officers,34
* FACTS does not contain intelligence information
but rather contains only information that is already
available to law enforcement officials,35 and
* FACTS does not perform data-mining operations,
but only gathers data that is already in possession of
law enforcement.36
11. REAL ID
The REAL ID Act of 2005, 37 passed as part of 109 H.R. 1268,38
was signed into law on May 11, 2005. The REAL ID Act contains
several important new provisions. In Title I, Amendments to Federal
Laws to Protect Against Terrorist Entry, the Act strengthens the
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Facilitating an Enhanced Information Sharing Network that Links Law Enforcement and
Homeland Security for Federal, State, and Local Governments, supra note 10, at 71-72.
35Id. at 72.
36 Id.
37 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 301-311 (2005).
38 H.R. 1268, 109th Cong. (2005).
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provisions that govern when an immigrant may not be admitted into
the country because of an association with terrorist activity.
39
Additionally, the Act modifies the review process for orders of
removal from the country.40 Title II, Improved Security for Drivers'
Licenses and Personal Identification Cards, creates minimum
standards for identification cards and drivers' licenses.4 1 Identification
that meets the specifications of the Act will be necessary if a federal
agency is requiring proof of identification in order for the agency to
accept it as valid." There are also additional requirements that must
be satisfied for issuance of identification to persons who have not
attained citizenship.43 Persons who are only temporarily in the
country are only eligible for a license or identification card that will
expire when their residency in the country expires.44 The Act,
additionally, strengthens federal jurisdiction with respect to border
regulation in Title III, Border Infrastructure and Technology
Integration. 45 Title III increases federal control over border security
and creates a pilot program that will result in greater border
surveillance.46 Finally, the Act places additional controls over
immigrant workers and immigrant worker status, and changes certain
visa provisions for persons from Australia and nurses.
4 7
A. DRIVERS' LICENSE AND IDENTIFICATION CARD REQUIREMENTS
Title II of the REAL ID Act of 2005 creates a new set of
requirements for drivers' licenses and identification cards in order for
" REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 103, 119 Stat. 231, 301-311 (2005).
40 Id. at § 101, 119 Stat. at 301-307.
41 Id. at § 202, 119 Stat. at 312-314.
42 Id. at § 202, 119 Stat. at 312.
43 Id. at § 202, 119 Stat. at 313.
44Id.
41 Id. at § 301-303, 119 Stat. at 316-318.
46Id.
41 Id. at § 401-407, § 501-502, 119 Stat. at 318-323 (modifies laws governing temporary
workers and immigrant visas).
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the identification to be accepted as valid by the federal government.
Starting in 2008, a federal agency will not accept a state issued
drivers' license or identification card that does not meet the minimum-
security requirements of the Act.48 An acceptable identification must
contain the following information.
* Full legal name;
" date of birth;
* gender;
" a card identification number;
" a digital photograph of the person;
" the address of principal place of residence;
* signature;
* a physical security feature designed to prevent
duplication, tampering, and counterfeiting for any
fraudulent purposes; and
" "[a] common machine-readable technology with
defined minimum data elements. '49
The Act also requires that the states only issue a personal
identification card or drivers' license with proper documentation of the
required information. The following information must be verified
with the issuing agency for validity, and completeness.
0 Name and birth date - verifiable through a photo
identity document, with a non-photo identity
document accepted only if it contains both a full
481d. at § 202, 119 Stat. at 312-313.
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legal name and birth date, such as a birth
certificate.50
" Proof of social security number or verification that
the person is not eligible for a social security
number:
o states are also required to check social
security account numbers with the Social
Security Administration and resolve any
conflicts, and
o should another license have been issued
under the same social security number by
that state or another state, it is the
responsibility of the state issuing the license
to resolve the discrepancy and take
appropriate action.5
* Documentation showing the person's name and
principal residence, and proof of lawful status,
which can be proven through several types of
documentation:
o valid documentary evidence that the person
is a citizen; or
o documentation that the person is a lawful
temporary or permanent resident,
conditional permanent resident, has
approved asylum, has a valid nonimmigrant
visa, has a pending asylum application,
approved deferred action status, or proof of
a pending application for adjustment. 2
50 Id. at § 202, 119 Stat. at 313.
51 Id.
52 Id.
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These rules also extend to temporary licenses and identification
cards. Digital images of the documentation utilized to obtain a
drivers' license or identification card will be retained in electronic
storage pursuant to storage requirements promulgated by the federal
government.5 3  States are also required to maintain databases
containing all drivers' license and identification card information as
well as motor vehicle histories and make that information available to
other states. 4 The original rationale behind strengthening federal
provisions regulating drivers' licenses was in response to the terrorist
attacks of Sept. 11, 2001." The stated rationale for increased security
measures for the issuance of drivers' licenses and identification cards
is to decrease the ease of obtaining fraudulent identification, through
the use of forged or inauthentic documents.
5 6
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STATES
Some states' rights advocates have argued that the REAL ID Act is
beyond the appropriate reach of the federal government because it is
an unfunded mandate requirinig extensive effort of the states without
guaranteeing federal funding.5  The Act places a significant burden on
the states to bring their systems of issuing drivers' licenses and
identification cards up to federal standards by May 11, 2008.5 The
Act contains a provision for the appropriation of federal funds to assist
the states, but there is no specific grant to each state, only a provision
" Id. at 119 Stat. 314 (Paper copies are to be retained for seven years and electronic copies for
ten years).
54 Id. at 119 Stat. 315.
55 DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 109TH CONG., REPORT ON THREE
STRIKES AGAINST THE SO-CALLED REAL ID ACT (H.R. 418): BAD FOR NATIONAL SECURITY,
BAD FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, BAD FOR VICTIMS OF PERSECUTION 18 (2005), available at
http://www.house.gov/judiciarydemocrats/hr418debatel09cong/demhr418views2905.pdf
(the REAL ID Act was previously contained in a separate bill before it was passed as part of
H.R. 1268).
56 id.
57 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, PREEMPTION MONITOR (2005),
http://www.ncsl.orgistandcomm/sclaw/preemption08O5.htm.
5 REAL ID Act of 2005, § 202, 119 Stat. 312.
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that the secretary "may make grants. ' 59 Furthermore, states receive
funding only if they join the inter-state compact to make information
available to all other states.6
0
The current administration claims that it will cost the states about
$100 million over five years to comply with the mandates of the
REAL ID Act. However, the National Conference of State
Legislatures estimates that figure at somewhere between $9-13
billion.6 1 According to some estimates, it would cost $85 million to
bring Pennsylvania alone up to compliance with the Act. States'
rights advocates estimate that these regulations will force State
Department of Motor Vehicle employees to spend a significant
amount of time verifying sources and exchanging information with
various other public agencies.63  Some advocates speculate that all
drivers' licenses will have to be reissued to comply with the Act.
64
The rationale behind this speculation is that even if the information
contained on the license or identification card is correct and properly
verified at issuance, it is likely that the documents used to obtain the
identification were not properly verified, nor were they digitally
recorded in the format necessary to be included in the federal
database.
65
California, in a budget signed into law on June 30, 2006,
appropriated $18.8 million and allocated 36 positions to help the state
comply with the Act. 66  A major concern in California is thepossibility of chaos at the Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV").
59 Id, at § 204, 119 Stat. 315.
60 id.
61 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURE, supra note 57.
62 Electronic Privacy Information Center, National ID Cards and REAL ID Act (2006),
http://www.epic.org/privacy/id-cards/.
63 Rich Ehisen, SNCJ Spotlight: What Will REAL ID Really Cost?, ST. NET CAPITOL J, Sept. 5,
2005, http://www.statenet.com/capitoljournal/09-05-2005.
64 id
65 Declan McCullagh, FAQ: How Real ID will Affect You, CNET NEWS.COM, May 6, 2005,
http://news.com.com/FAQ+How+Real+ID+will+affect+you/2100-1028_3-5697111 .html.
66 Lynda Gledhill, Long Waits Looming for License Renewals; DMV Officials Fear New
Federal ID Rules Will Lengthen Lines, THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, July 24, 2006, at Al.
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With DMV facilities already crowded by just maintaining normal
business, there is concern that complying with the REAL ID Act will
create even larger delays. 67 Virginia's REAL ID Task Force estimates
the cost of implementation in Virginia at somewhere between $33 and
$169 million. 8 The Governor of Virginia has proposed an additional
fee on drivers' license renewal to help cover the cost of the program.
69
California and other states are still waiting on rules, expected by
the end of 2006, issued by the federal government, explaininghow the
states are to comply with the provisions of the REAL ID Act. States
wishing to begin compliance are at a standstill, waiting for federal
regulations more than a year after the passage of the Act. Because of
the delay in the issuance of federal rules, the National Governor's
Association is requesting that the compliance deadline be pushed back
from the original May 2008 deadline.7
While states are free to reject the requirements of REAL ID, there
is speculation that some businesses may require a REAL ID compliant
identification to complete transactions, and it will be necessary for
both national and international travel. New Hampshire has tried to
reject the requirements of the Act.73 The New Hampshire legislature
has debated several bills that would keep the state from participating
in the REAL ID program.74  Further complicating the ban, New
Hampshire has been chosen as one of two states that would run a pilot
program for REAL ID, obtaining a $3 million federal grant, although
privacy advocates in the New Hampshire legislature oppose taking the
funding.75 Additionally, it is possible that by failing to comply with
67 Id.
68 Tim McGlone, Lack ofInformation Stymies ID Plans, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT, July 15, 2006,
at B 1.
69id.
7 0 Gledhill, supra note 66.
71 McGlone, supra note 68.
72 id.
73 Tom Fahey, Efforts to Kill REAL ID Program Fall Short, THE UNION LEADER, May 12,
2006, at A8.
74 id.
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the requirements of the REAL ID Act, states will limit their residents'
abilities to interact with the federal government.
C. PROPONENTS OF THE REAL ID ACT
Proponents of the REAL ID Act focus on terrorism prevention as
the almost sole justification for the new drivers' license and
identification card requirements. House Judiciary Committee Chair
James Sensenbrenner stated
[t]he goal of the REAL ID Act is straightforward: it seeks to
prevent another 9/11-type attack by disrupting terrorist travel
... American citizens have the right to know who is in their
country, that people are who they say they are, and that the
name on a driver's license is the holder's real name, not
some alias.76
By creating uniform requirements for the issuance of visas to non-
residents, proponents of the REAL ID Act hope the Act will lead to
better monitoring of foreign visitors. Representative Sensenbrenner
cites to the case of terrorist Mohammed Atta who received a six-
month visa to stay in the United States yet received a Florida driver's
license good for six years. 77
Proponents also argue that these strict requirements for the
issuance of a driver's licenses will deter terrorist activity on their
face.78 Drafters intend the recording of the documentation used to
obtain identification to deter the use of fraudulent documentation, in
hope that the requirements will deter people who would potentially
obtain fraudulent identification by virtue of the requirements of the
new law alone.
79
76 Press Release, United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary,
Sensenbrermer Introduces Terrorist Travel Legislation: REAL ID Act Contains Provisions
Dropped from 9/11 Legislation (Jan. 26, 2005), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/newscenter.aspx?A=430.
77 Id.
78See id.
'9 See id.
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D. PRIVACY IMPACT AND CONCERNS ABOUT THE REAL ID ACT
Numerous opponents of the identification provisions of the REAL
ID Act exist. One of their main concerns is that the requirements of
the REAL ID Act will do nothing to deter or limit terrorist activity but
will be burdensome for states and residents.80  Encompassed in this
concern is the increased incentive to create fraudulent documentation
to obtain an identification card or drivers' license. Employees in state
DMVs will not possess sufficient training to recognize these
fraudulent documents, enabling fraudulent licenses to be obtained
regardless of these additional protections.81 Also, there are privacy
concerns about making the information available nationally so the
states can perform the proper documentation verification. 82  It is
questionable how distribution of the necessary verification information
will operate and how many state resources will be consumed to create
the database. s Given the requirements of the Act and the exposure to
sensitive information, state employees who have access to this
personal information will be subject to background checks, which
could result in staffing shortages.8 4 There may also be further
conflicts with state laws and exceptions, as some states have special
provisions that allow the issuance of drivers' licenses without a photo,
often because people object to the photograph for religious reasons.8 5
Much of the additional concern surrounding the REAL ID Act
focuses on the new requirement that data sharing among the states
occur. Sharing and integrating the information may require the use of
a data broker. "[P]rivacy advocates and opponents of the 'REAL ID'
80 DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 55, at 18.
" Id. at 20.
12 Brian Bergstein, Fstration OverDriver's LicemeLaw: Anti-Terrorism Law Requiring
Standardized ID Called A "Nightmare, " CBS NEws, Jan. 12, 2006,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/01/12/tech/main1206578.shtml.
83 Id.
84 id.
85 Id.
86 Martin H. Bosworth, TSA 's Privacy Law Violations May Lead to More Abuses,
CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM, July 28, 2005, http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2005/
tsa_privacy.html (a data broker would most likely be a private company responsible for
integrating and making the required information and documentation available to all the states).
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Act believe that entrusting such a complex enterprise to companies
that have already proven incapable of protecting the data they collect
may lead to even more instances of identity theft., 87 Further, with the
storage of digital images of personal records, there are additional
concerns about the capability of reproducing that documentation and
using it to obtain fraudulent identification. The ACLU worries that
required state compliance with the REAL ID Act could amount to an
"irretrievable loss of citizens' privacy. 88
Federal funding will be necessary for most states to comply with
the mandates of the Act. To be eligible for funding, states will be
required to add information about their residents to the national
database and accept the risks inherent in the centralization of this
personal information. With so much personal information digitally
recorded and stored in a single database, there will be significant
potential for identity theft.
III. DNA COLLECTION
All fifty states have some mechanism for collecting DNA from
certain classes of convicted offenders.8 9 The federal government also
has similar provisions. 9° However, as DNA collection increases and
sharing and storage of this information moves from a local scale to a
national scale, privacy concerns arise about the safety of the
information. 9 1 Further, the United States Supreme Court never fully
examined a number of provisions for DNA collection from felons.
Privacy advocates question the propriety of maintaining a database of
such personal information. These DNA databases are also widely
accessible to employees of various law enforcement agencies. 92 As
the collection of DNA information expands to include persons who
87 id.
88 Ehisen, supra note 63.
89 Martha L. Lawson, Note, Personal Does Not Always Equal "Private": The
Constitutionality of Requiring DNA Samples from Convicted Felons and Arrestees, 9 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 645,650 (2001).
90 Id
91 Id.
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were arrested, but not convicted concerns about privacy in
identification through DNA increases.93
A. RECENT COURT DECISIONS ON DNA COLLECTION
1. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Recently, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari to
hear whether the collection of DNA from incarcerated felons is
constitutional.94 The Court has also denied certiorari to consider
whether collection is proper from parolees.95  The Georgia statute
questioned in Padgett v. Donald 6 mandates the collection of DNA
samples from all incarcerated felons for analysis and storage in a
database maintained by the Georgia Bureau of Corrections. DNA
samples can be collected through various means but most often is
obtained through scraping the inside of the cheek with a swab. The
DNA profiles of these persons are available for release to "federal,
state, and local law enforcement officers upon a request made in
furtherance of an official investigation of any criminal offense." 97 In
the lower court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, the Appellants, incarcerated felons in the Georgia Department
of Corrections, argued that this statute violated their constitutional
rights because it amounted to an unreasonable search and seizure, is
unreasonably vague, deprived them of due process, and violated their
privacy rights.98 The Eleventh Circuit rejected these arguments.99 The
United States Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of whether
a person's rights are violated by the collection, categorization, and
sharing of DNA; however, with increasingly stringent DNA collection
mandates on both the state and federal levels, the Court may be forced
to adjudicate this issue.
93 Id.
94 Boulineau v. Donald, 126 S. Ct. 352 (2005).
95 Kincade v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1638 (2005).
96 Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 1275 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
97 GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-63 (2005) (see also GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-60).
9' Padgett, 401 F.3d at 1276 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
99 1d. at 1282.
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2. LOWER COURT CHALLENGES TO THE DNA COLLECTION LAWS
The first case that challenged the constitutionality of mandatory
DNA sampling from convicted felons was Jones v. Murray in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.100 The court
found that the government interest in preventing crime outweighed the
convicted felon's limited privacy interest for two reasons:
* the state interest in deterring recidivism among
felony offenders is a more important interest when
balanced against the minimal intrusion that occurs
from taking a DNA sample from an already
convicted offender and the questionable claim of
privacy in their identity after conviction, and
* the requirement that persons incarcerated before this
law had taken effect give a DNA sample does not
constitute a retroactive sentence.101
Persons are now challenging, on privacy grounds, federal law that
mandates DNA collection from everyone convicted of a federal
felony.10 2  The DNA Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 is also
challenged on grounds that there is no limit on the use of DNA nor is
there any statutory mandate concerning how long DNA can be stored
and utilized by law enforcement. 0  Additionally, litigants have
challenged the Act's requirement that persons convicted of non-violent
felonies must submit DNA samples, based on evidence that persons
convicted of non-violent crimes are no more likely than the general
population to be convicted of a crime.
10 4
100 Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992).
'°lid. at 310-11.
102 David Harper, Judges Hear Arguments Challenging DNA Collection from Federal Felons,
THE TULSA WORLD, Nov. 22, 2005, at A9.
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A Massachusetts man, Richard Frank, is going to trial in the
Boston Municipal Court for refusing to give a DNA sample. 10 5 The
sample was forcibly taken from him after he was arrested, with four
corrections officers forcing him to submit, holding him down, and
pricking his finger to draw blood sufficient to obtain a DNA sample.
10 6
Frank is the first person in Massachusetts to refuse to 0 rovide his
DNA, 10 7 a crime punishable by Massachusetts statute. 1°P This law
provides that "[a]ny person required to provide a DNA sample
pursuant to this chapter and who refuses to provide such DNA sample
shall be subject to punishment by a fine of not more than $1,000 or
imprisonment in a jail or house of correction for not more than six
months or both."' 0 9
B. NEW FEDERAL LEGISLATION
The Senate reauthorized the Violence Against Women Act"0° on
October 3, 2005, and President Bush signed it into law on January 5,
2006. This Act allows DNA samples from federal criminal arrestees
to be included in the National DNA Index System ("NDIS")."ll DNA
is analyzed pursuant to the Combined DNA Index System ("CODIS"),
established in 1990.112 The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI")
designed and now maintains CODIS." 3 CODIS is a three-tiered
'
05 Ric Kahn, DNA for the Taking: Convictions from His Past Left No Right to Refuse Blood
Sampling, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 14, 2005, at City Weekly 1.
106 id.
107 Id.
108 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 22E, § I I(LexisNexis 2005).
109Id.
10 Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization, Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960
(2006).
"1 Press Release, Senator Jon Kyl Press Office, Senate Reauthorizes Violence Against
Women Act: Includes Kyl Amendment to Remove Barriers to Maintaining Data From
Criminal Arrests (Oct. 5, 2005), available at http://kyl.senate.gov/record.cfin?id=246925.
112 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE FBI's
COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM PROGRAM, available at
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/brochure.pdf
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database. 1 4 The highest level is the NDIS system, which enables law
enforcement to share DNA information on a national level."' Sub-
levels are both local and state databases that allow sharing information
on a more limited scale.1
16
Under the proposed law, as soon as a person is charged in a
pleading, the government places their information in the NDIS.1"7 The
database holds the person's information solely because he or she is a
federal criminal arrestee. There is no requirement that he or she be a
violent offender."' Additionally, defendants not convicted of the
offense must opt out of the NDIS if they want their information
removed.1 9 A person may request removal by:
" sending a certified copy of the final court order
stating that a conviction has been overturned to the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; or
* by sending the Attorney General either a certified
copy of the final court order in which a charge has
been dismissed, acquitted or stating that no charge
was filed within the appropriate time period. 120
Current federal law allows states the leeway to take DNA samples on
arrest and include those DNA samples in lower level - state and
federal - databases. The current law does not allow uploading of
DNA information into the federal NDIS database until the person is
convicted.' 2 1 Under the proposed law, information can enter the NDIS
114Id.
115id.
116 Senate Reauthorizes Violence Against Women Act, supra note 111.
1178Id.
1191Id
120 id.
121 Press Release, Office of Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy, Statement of Senator Patrick
Leahy, Senate Consideration of Reauthorization of Violence Against Women Act, S. 1197
(Oct. 5, 2005), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200510/1005O5.html.
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before bringing formal charges or even if formal charges are never
brought. The arrestee bears the burden of having his information
removed from the NDIS.1
22
C. STATE PROVISIONS FOR THE COLLECTION OF DNA
While all fifty states have some mechanism for DNA collection
from certain offenders, 123 some states have also begun collecting DNA
from persons arrested for certain crimes. Virginia became the first
state to create a DNA database in 1989. In 2002, Virginia enacted a
provision that allows taking a DNA sample for analysis from every
person arrested for the commission or attempted commission of a
violent felony.124 The results of these DNA analyses are made directly
available to all local, state, and federal law enforcement officials.1 D
Louisiana has enacted a similar statute that allows for the collection of
DNA from persons arrested for certain offenses. 126 Starting in 2009,
in California, adults arrested for any felony offense will be required to
submit to a DNA test and that information will be filed in a DNA
database. 27 This California law was passed as part of Proposition 69,
and privacy advocates argue that this new law will make it difficult for
persons who are not subsequently convicted to have their information
removed from the database. 128 The proposition requires that persons
who wish to have their information removed from the database take
the following three steps.
122 id.
123 id.
124 Tracey Maclin, Is Obtaining an Arrestee's DNA a Valid Special Needs Search Under the
Fourth Amendment? What Should (and Will) the Supreme Court Do?, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs
102, 104 (2005).
125 Id.
126 id.
127 Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Why the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse Opposes California
Proposition 69: "DNA Samples. Collection. Database. Funding. Initiative Statute," Nov. 5,
2004, http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/Prop69.htm.
128 Id.
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* "Send a formal request to the trial court of the
county in which" he or she was arrested,
" "[s]end a formal request to the DNA Laboratory of
the California Department of Justice," and
* "[s]end a formal request to the prosecuting attorney
of the county in which" he or she was "arrested,
convicted, or adjudicated, with proof of service on
all parties." 129
Even if the arrestee follows these steps, the judge may still decide not
to remove their DNA information from the database, and the decision
is not appealable. 130 This type of DNA collection is troubling to
privacy advocates, because DNA can be taken and added to a database
without conviction and arrest requires a much lower standard of
suspicion.
States collect DNA with varying frequency for a variety of
offenses at varying stages of criminal prosecution. Utah 131 and
Maryland 132  collect DNA from persons convicted of certain
misdemeanor offenses as well as felonies. Most states that have DNA
collection programs, have DNA collection provisions for misdemeanor
violent crimes and misdemeanor sex crimes.13 3 A minority of states
collect DNA from all adults convicted of any felony, but some limit
this collection to persons convicted of a violent felony, while others
include juveniles in this collection process.134  Only California,
129 id.
130 id.
131 UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-10-403 (2006).
132 MD. CODE ANN. Pub. Safety § 2-504 (2006).
133 Seth Axelrad, Research Assistant ,The American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics,
Survey of State DNA Database Statutes (2004), available at
http://www.aslme.org/dna_04/grid/guide.pdf (see also DNA Database Statute Grid,
http://www.aslme.org/dna_04/grid/statutegrid452006.html for same information).
134 id.
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Louisiana, New York Texas, and Virginia have mechanisms for
sampling upon arrest.1B
D. RATIONALE FOR ALLOWING DNA COLLECTION FROM ARRESTED
FELONS
The rationale for collecting DNA from convicted felons is that
convicted felons forfeit their privacy rights when found guilty. 136 This
theory falls apart when we consider the implications of taking DNA
from persons who are only arrested or charged with a crime.'13 DNA
collection has also been justified as a "special needs" search under the
Fourth Amendment because there is no probable cause requirement or
judicial authorization required for the search. 138 The special needs
doctrine allows for searches in contexts where there is no suspicion
sufficient to justify getting a warrant for the search. 3 9 There are
inconsistencies in the special needs doctrine and no clear pattern for
circumstances that fit within the doctrine which includes taking DNA
samples from those convicted of crimes. 40 Experts question whether
taking DNA from arrestees, rather than from persons already
convicted, will fall within this exception to the warrant requirement. 11
It is likely that courts will be called upon to decide whether taking
DNA samples from arrestees without a warrant is a constitutionally
permissible search. As discussed above, cases are currently being
litigated in state courts to determine the constitutionality of certain
provisions for the collection of DNA and how these provisions balance
against a person's right to privacy in his or her own DNA.
135 Id.
136 Editorial, Use DNA Databases Only for Criminals, THE RoANOKE TIMEs, Oct. 2, 2005, at
Horizon Editorial 2.
137 Id.
138 Maclin, supra note 124, at 107.
139 id.
14°Id. at 115.
'
411d. at 117-18.
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E. PRIVACY CONCERNS IMPLICATED IN DNA COLLECTION
Privacy advocates are especially concerned about these new rules.
"This clearly opens the door to all kinds of race- or ethnic-based
[police] stops," according to privacy protective statements made by
James Dempsey of the Center for Democracy and Technology.142 The
concern is that persons suspected of any wrongdoing or persons who
police simply suspect, without more, can be stopped, arrested, and
their DNA nationally compared and analyzed without sufficient
suspicion that they have committed any particular crime.
Additionally, pursuant to the amendment contained in the Violence
Against Women Reauthorization, information will be uploaded into a
national database upon arrest, as opposed to the current rule where
information is not uploaded until the person is convicted. 143 A person
now has to opt out of the database if he or she is not convicted, which
can place a substantial burden on a person who has the misfortune of
being arrested for a crime of which he or she was not convicted. 1
44
Many state statutes provide penalties for improper usage of DNA
information contained in databases designed only for investigatory
purposes. 145 States such as Alabama, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, New York, South Dakota, and Vermont have laws that
make tampering with DNA evidence or a DNA sample a criminal
felony. In some states, there is no provision at all for improper
treatment of DNA samples collected from offenders. 147 States are
similarly divided when it comes to protecting DNA databases from
improper usage by unauthorized persons. It is a Class B or C felony in
some states to improperly use the DNA database. In other states, there
142 Jonathan Krim, Bill Would Permit DNA Collection From All Those Arrested, THE
WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 24, 2005, at A03 (quoting Jim Dempsey of the Center for
Democracy and Technology). See also, 151 CONG. REC. 128 (2005).
143 Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy, supra note 121.
144 Id.
145 Axelrad, supra note 133.
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is no criminal penalty for unauthorized use and access to the DNA
samples and information. 1
48
Researchers can use DNA databases, legally, for purposes other
than criminal investigations according to certain state statutes. 149 In
Alabama, researchers can use information contained in the DNA
samples obtained pursuant to convictions for research about the
causation, detection, or prevention of disease and disability, and the
broad category of assisting human endeavors in educational or medical
research if researchers remove identifying information.!15 Some
additional statutes are unclear about the acceptability of additional
research, while others expressly prohibit any use of DNA samples
other than those strictly related to investigatory purposes.'51 Further
concerns include the fate of DNA samples after the necessary
information has been gathered and entered into the database. Many
states still have unclear rules about what happens to the samples after
DNA information is obtained and cataloged.
There are additional concerns about having so much data in one
place. With respect to large databases, there is an increased risk that
those databases will be breached because they create a single target.
153
With the recent theft of approximately 145,000 consumer profiles
from ChoicePoint, 154 it is clear that having such a large database of
DNA information creates a target for security breaches, which could
lead to the release of incredible amounts of DNA information.
CONCLUSION
The types of technologies discussed in this article allow the
government to collect an ever-increasing amount of information about
its citizens. The MATRIX program allowed for the aggregation of a
148 Id.
149 id.
"0 ALA. CODE § 36-18-31 (2006).
15 Axelrad, supra note 133.
152 id.
153 Hoover & Chabrow, supra note 21.
154 Goldfarb, supra note 22.
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significant amount of government-held and publicly available
information into a searchable format. States are still attempting to find
ways to use this data, while overcoming the obstacles of differing state
participation and enthusiasm for these types of initiatives. States also
face the obstacles of overcoming differing state privacy laws and
opposition from privacy-oriented interest groups such as the ACLU.
The ACLU is also opposed to the REAL ID Act, which among other
provisions, mandates that states create a system of drivers' licenses
and identification cards that comply with federal standards. The
creation of this national system of identification also requires that
states store and make available to other states and the federal
government a large amount of personal information. Objections to
this innovation in storage and the use of searchable technology are
most likely similar to those objections to the MATRIX program
because the REAL ID database will be a searchable database of
personal information and digital images of personal identification
documents.
The DNA collection provisions that states and the federal
government are enacting provide another way that the states and the
federal government can collect and catalog information. New
provisions allow information to be collected upon arrest, implicating a
number of personal privacy issues that previously constituted a less
complex question about the rights of those already convicted of a
crime. As these new issues emerge with DNA collection from
arrestees, the creation of new systemized identification cards and
drivers' licenses, and states investigating the creation of programs
similar to the MATRIX program, states will have to balance the
interest of protecting personal privacy with the legitimate government
objectives that these programs advance, primarily preventing terrorist
activities and future crime.
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